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Despite two decades of declining crime rates and a decade 
of efforts to reduce mass incarceration, some policymakers 
continue to call for tougher sentences and greater use of 
incarceration to reduce crime.1 It may seem intuitive that in-
creasing incarceration would further reduce crime: incarcer-
ation not only prevents future crimes by taking people who 
commit crime “out of circulation” (incapacitation), but it also 
may dissuade people from committing future crimes out of 
fear of punishment (deterrence).2 In reality, however, increas-
ing incarceration rates has a minimal impact on reducing 
crime and entails significant costs:
 › Increases in incarceration rates have a small impact on 
crime rates and each additional increase in incarcer-
ation rates has a smaller impact on crime rates than 
previous increases.3 
 › Any crime reduction benefits of incarceration are limited 
to property crime. Research consistently shows that 
higher incarceration rates are not associated with lower 
violent crime rates.4
 › Incarceration may increase crime in certain circum-
stances. In states with high incarceration rates and 
neighborhoods with concentrated incarceration, the 
increased use of incarceration may be associated with 
increased crime.5
 › Incarceration is expensive. The United States is spending 
heavily on jails and prisons and under-investing in less 
expensive, more effective ways to reduce and prevent 
crime.6
* This brief uses the broad term “incarceration,” which can 
encompass confinement in both prisons and jails. Much of 
the research conducted to date, however, examines impris-
onment only, and not incarceration in America’s jails.
Summary*
Why won’t more incarceration 
reduce crime? 
Incarceration has a marginal impact  
on crime 
There is a very weak relationship between higher incarcer-
ation rates and lower crime rates. Although studies differ 
somewhat, most of the literature shows that between 1980 
and 2000, each 10 percent increase in incarceration rates 
was associated with just a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate.7 
Since then, only one empirical analysis (a study that requires 
corroboration) has examined the relationship between 
incarceration and crime.8 Overall, the increased use of 
incarceration through the 1990s accounted for between 6 
and 25 percent of the  total reduction in crime rates.9 Since 
2000, however, the increased use of incarceration accounted 
for nearly zero percent of the overall reduction in crime.10 
This means that somewhere between 75 and 100 percent of 
2the reduction in crime rates since the 1990s is explained by 
other factors. Research has shown that the aging population, 
increased wages, increased employment, increased gradu-
ation rates, increased consumer confidence, increased law 
enforcement personnel, and changes in policing strategies 
were associated with lower crime rates and, collectively, 
explain more of the overall reduction in crime rates than 
does incarceration.11
Incarceration has a diminishing impact  
on crime
The relationship between higher incarceration rates and 
lower crime rates is weak, and is getting weaker.12 Research 
shows that each additional increase in incarceration rates 
will be associated with a smaller and smaller reduction in 
crime rates.13 This is because individuals convicted of serious 
or repeat offenses receive prison sentences even when 
overall rates of incarceration are low. To continue to increase 
incarceration rates requires that prisons be used for individ-
uals convicted of lower-level or infrequent offenses as well. 
Thus, since the early 1990s, the crime reduction benefits of 
additional prison expansion have been smaller and more 
expensive to achieve.14 This diminishing impact of incarcer-
ation also explains the lack of crime reduction benefits of 
higher incarceration rates through the 2000s. Increases in 
correctional populations when incarceration rates are already 
high have less impact on crime than increases in populations 
when incarceration rates are low.15
Incarceration has little to no effect  
on violent crime 
The weak association between higher incarceration rates and 
lower crime rates applies almost entirely to property crime.16 
Research consistently shows that higher incarceration rates 
are not associated with lower violent crime rates.17 This is 
because the expansion of incarceration primarily means 
that larger numbers of individuals convicted of nonviolent, 
“marginal” offenses—drug offenses and low-level property 
offenses, as well as those who are convicted of “infrequent” 
offenses—are imprisoned.18 Those convicted of violent and 
repeat offenses are likely to receive prison sentences regard-
less of the incarceration rate. Thus, increasing incarceration 
rates for those convicted of nonviolent, marginal offenses 
does nothing to impact the violent crime rate.19 
Incarceration will increase crime in states 
and communities with already high  
incarceration rates 
Although it may seem counterintuitive, research has shown 
that incarceration may actually increase crime. At the state 
level, there may be an “inflection point” where increases in 
state incarceration rates are associated with higher crime 
rates.20 This state-level phenomenon mirrors a similar 
occurrence in specific neighborhoods, where communities 
may reach an incarceration “tipping point” after which future 
increases in incarceration lead to higher crime rates.21 The 
argument is that high rates of imprisonment break down the 
social and family bonds that guide individuals away from 
crime, remove adults who would otherwise nurture children, 
deprive communities of income, reduce future income 
potential, and engender a deep resentment toward the legal 
system; thus, as high incarceration becomes concentrated in 
certain neighborhoods, any potential public safety benefits 
are outweighed by the disruption to families and social 
groups that would help keep crime rates low.22 
At the individual level, there is also some evidence that 
incarceration itself is criminogenic, meaning that spending 
time in jail or prison actually increases a person’s risk of 
engaging in crime in the future.23 This may be because 
people learn criminal habits or develop criminal networks 
while incarcerated, but it may also be because of the 
collateral consequences that derive from even short periods 
of incarceration, such as loss of employment, loss of stable 
housing, or disruption of family ties.24
Incarceration is an expensive way to 
achieve little public safety 
The United States incarcerated 1.2 million more people in 
prison in 2000 than in 1975 to achieve little public safety 
benefit. By 2000, the incarceration rate was 270 percent 
higher than in 1975, but the violent crime rate was nearly 
identical to the rate in 1975 and the property crime rate was 
nearly 20 percent lower than in 1975. Put another way, the 
United States was spending roughly $33 billion on incarcer-
ation in 2000 for essentially the same level of public safety 
it achieved in 1975 for $7.4 billion—nearly a quarter of the 
cost.25 But the costs of high incarceration rates go well be-
yond the financial costs to government. Mass incarceration 
also imposes significant social, cultural, and political costs 
on individuals, families, and communities.26 Incarceration 
reduces employment opportunities, reduces earnings, limits 
3economic mobility and, perhaps more importantly, has an 
intergenerational impact that increases the chances that 
children of incarcerated parents will live in poverty and 
engage in delinquent behavior.27
What can policymakers do to 
reduce crime without the use of 
incarceration?
Prior research indicates several factors associated with lower 
crime rates: aging population, increased wages, increased 
employment, increased graduation rates, increased consumer 
confidence, increased law enforcement personnel, and 
changes in policing strategies.28 Policymakers have many 
tools at their disposal to address crime rates based on these 
factors in the long term. They can implement policies that 
require investment outside the criminal justice system to 
increase graduation rates, employment, income, or consumer 
confidence. But there are short-term solutions to reducing 
crime as well. Research points to several criminal justice 
practices that policymakers can adopt that are more effective 
and less expensive than incarceration at reducing crime.
Use community crime prevention strategies 
Several policing and community-engagement strategies can 
reduce the incidence of crime in local jurisdictions.29 Place-
based problem-oriented policing approaches, for example, 
significantly reduce crime rates; such approaches involve 
carefully analyzing crime and disorder in small geographic 
areas and addressing such problems through tailor-made 
solutions, such as situational crime prevention measures 
(repairing fences, improving lighting, erecting road barriers) 
and community improvements (removing graffiti, nuisance 
abatement).30 Similarly, several jurisdictions also have 
renewed efforts to implement and improve community polic-
ing approaches—such as working with business owners to 
identify neighborhood problems, conducting citizen surveys 
and outreach, and improving recreational opportunities for 
youth—in order to engage more closely with communities 
to identify and solve crime problems. Evaluations show 
that such programs can reduce both violent and property 
crimes.31
To address violent crime, several jurisdictions have imple-
mented focused deterrence strategies that 1) identify high-
risk individuals who are responsible for a disproportionate 
share of violent crime, 2) advise such individuals that they 
will be subjected to intensified enforcement if they continue 
to engage in violence, and 3) provide targeted individuals 
with access to social services. Evaluations of such programs 
have shown significant reductions in violent crime, including 
homicides and gun-related offenses.32 Finally, several studies 
also have shown that jurisdictions working with residents 
to increase collective crime prevention techniques or to 
implement situational crime prevention techniques can 
reduce property crimes in targeted neighborhoods.33
Increase the availability and use of alterna-
tive-to-incarceration programs 
Several types of alternative-to-incarceration programs that 
offer supportive services (like mental health, substance abuse, 
employment, housing, Medicaid, public benefits, and com-
munity health centers) can reduce criminal activity among 
participants.34 For example, law enforcement-led diversion 
programs that divert individuals at the point of arrest and 
prosecution-led diversion programs that divert individuals 
either pre-charge or defer prosecution post-charge have 
been shown to reduce future criminal activity of program 
participants.35 Several meta-analyses show that participation 
in drug courts—specialized courts that combine drug treat-
ment with supervision to reduce drug use and drug-related 
crime—can significantly reduce recidivism among partici-
pants.36 Research also suggests that other specialty courts 
may reduce criminal activity of targeted groups. Mental 
health courts, for example, combine treatment-oriented and 
problem-solving strategies to reduce recidivism and contact 
with the criminal justice system among individuals with 
mental health issues.37 Juvenile diversion programs divert 
youth out of traditional criminal case processing and into a 
variety of alternatives, including restorative justice programs, 
community service, substance abuse treatment, skills-build-
ing programs, or family treatment.38 
Employ community corrections approaches 
Several community corrections approaches, which provide 
supervision and services to individuals in the community 
post-conviction, can reduce criminal activity among partici-
pants without the use of incarceration.39 Reducing caseloads 
for probation officers and focusing on evidence-based 
practices like risk/needs assessments, separate specialized 
caseloads, intensive wraparound services, and comprehen-
sive case management can significantly reduce re-arrest rates 
4among high-risk probationers.40 In addition, community 
supervision programs that target moderate- and high-risk 
adults and incorporate cognitive behavioral therapy have 
been shown to reduce recidivism rates among program par-
ticipants.41 Investment in reentry programs for those already 
incarcerated, such as pre-release programming and aftercare 
services, in-prison therapeutic communities, and transitional 
planning, can significantly reduce criminal activity of those 
released from incarceration.42
It is possible to reduce  
incarceration and crime
Experiences in several states offer evidence that policy-
makers can reduce crime without increasing imprisonment. 
In fact, 19 states reduced both imprisonment and crime 
rates over the last 15 years.43 (See Figure 1 below.) These 
states represent a diverse cross-section of the United States, 
including large states like Texas and small states like Alaska; 
Northeastern states like Connecticut and Midwestern states 
like Michigan; Southern states like Louisiana and Western 
states like Hawaii. Socially liberal states like New York, 
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Figure 1
Percent change in state crime rates and imprisonment rates, 2000-2015.
5wealthy states like Maryland, and states with low crime 
rates like Vermont simultaneously reduced incarceration and 
crime rates, but so did socially conservative states like Utah, 
economically distressed states like Mississippi, and states 
with high crime rates like Nevada. 
The experiences across states also indicate that the 
relationship between incarceration and crime is neither 
predictable nor consistent. The state with the largest de-
crease in incarceration rates—New Jersey (with a 37 percent 
decrease between 2000 and 2015)—also experienced a 30 
percent decrease in crime rates during the same period. The 
state with the largest increase in incarceration rates—West 
Virginia (with an 83 percent increase between 2000 and 
2015)—also experienced a 4 percent increase in crime rates. 
Among the 10 states with the largest decreases in crime 
rates between 2000 and 2015, five also reduced incarceration 
rates.44 Indeed, the state with the largest decrease in crime 
rates—Vermont—also reduced incarceration rates. Between 
2000 and 2015, only four states—Arkansas, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia—experienced increases in 
crime rates, and all four also experienced increased incarcer-
ation rates. 
The practices and programs adopted at the state and local 
levels in many of these states—community-based crime 
prevention, innovative policing strategies, diversion, and 
community corrections programs—likely explain these 
disparate trends in incarceration rates and crime rates over 
the last 15 years. As national policymakers call for increased 
incarceration and many state and local policymakers feel 
pressure to introduce measures to keep crime rates low, offi-
cials would do well to look toward states that have reduced 
both incarceration and crime for examples of innovation.
Conclusion
After 25 years of consistently declining crime rates, poli-
cymakers continue to feel pressure to introduce measures 
to address even small upticks in crime. This is understand-
able—policymakers should seek solutions to the problems 
of violence and embrace practices and policies that can keep 
crime rates low. Filling the nation’s prisons is not one of 
them. The impact of incarceration on crime is limited and 
has been diminishing for several years. Increased incarcer-
ation has no effect on violent crime and may actually lead 
to higher crime rates when incarceration is concentrated in 
certain communities. Instead, policymakers can reduce crime 
without continuing to increase the social, cultural, and politi-
cal costs of mass incarceration by investing in more effective 
and efficient crime reduction strategies that seek to engage 
the community, provide needed services to those who are 
criminally involved, and begin to address the underlying 
causes of crime. 
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